The John Stuart Mill Lecture is an annual event at the John Stuart Mill College, marking the end of the academic year. Unlike other extracurricular events, where students and teachers invite practitioners from the fields of Philosophy, Politics and Economics, the John Stuart Mill Lecture is reserved for academic lectures. Previous lecturers have included Peter Singer, Professor of Bioethics at Princeton University and Rainer Hegselman, Professor of Philosophy at the Frankfurt School of Finance & Management .
Prof. dr. Casier started his lecture with an overview of recent changes in the geopolitical order, including Russia’s war in Ukraine. He argued for three main points: That Russia’s war against Ukraine had bolstered the regional role of the EU and its identification as a geopolitical actor, but that this does not per definition translate into a stronger global role of the EU, and that the EU was struggling to combine this newfound geopolitical role with its classical liberal role.
For the first point, Casier stressed that the war was a blunt violation of international law, as Russia had previously recognised the sovereignty of Ukraine. He also stated that the main driver of Russian foreign policy is the country’s quest for great power status via territorial expansion, after failing to be recognised by the West in the 1990s. He then explained that the war was a game changer for the EU, as the block’s countries came together to support Ukraine. In response, the EU imposed sanctions, reduced its dependence on Russian fossil fuels, and sent military aid to Ukraine. Casier noted that while the recent crisis has not produced major reform, the EU has nonetheless granted candidate status to three countries with a territorial dispute with Russia: Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia.
Secondly, Casier asked whether the EU could equally “get its act together” on a global level. He stated that, despite the EU's increased awareness of supply chain and critical raw material risks, the rapid pace of change in world politics means the EU may always be one step behind. For example, the EU has failed to develop a clear response to the conflict in Gaza. Also, he noted that developing countries consider the war in Ukraine a “regional European conflict” and prefer non-alignment and strategic autonomy over choosing sides.
Lastly, Casier reflected on the effects the war in Ukraine might have on the EU’s traditional self-conception as a liberal normative power. He noted that assuming a greater geopolitical role necessitates increasing one’s coercive capacities − a development that has been slower than some in the EU might like − due to the EU's inability to coordinate its national capacities effectively. Additionally, the EU needs to reform the decision-making process in its foreign and security policy, which still relies on consensus decisions. Finally, the EU is struggling how to define China, alternately calling it a cooperation partner, negotiating partner, economic competitor, or systemic rival.
After this, Casier opened up the floor to the students. Questions ranged from the role of NATO in European defense to why the EU has not reformed any treaties since the Treaty of Lisbon. Casier noted that even traditionally Atlanticist countries like Poland now call for European defense and attributed the lack of treaty reforms to fears that Eurosceptic populist parties would exploit such changes. He dismissed the argument that NATO's actions in the 1990s contributed to Russia's current aggression as a “logical leap”, but acknowledged missed opportunities to integrate Russia into the West. On the war in Ukraine, he said that he was pessimistic about the war ending in the next year, noting Russia's capacity to continue fighting and suggesting that any change would result from social tensions in Russia. Regarding the future international order, he doubted a strong China-Russia alliance, referring to potential conflicts due to China's rapid growth and noting China's complex stance on the liberal international order.